The Rise of Autocratic Legalism in the Philippine Polity
Analytical Studies & Perspectives of Roldan G. Gorgonio
In contemporary political science and constitutional law, the term “lawfare” has migrated from its origins in asymmetric international conflict to describe a insidious domestic phenomenon: the strategic manipulation of legal systems by executive authorities to crush opposition, circumvent constitutional checks, and entrench elite dominance (Dunlap, 2008; Scheppele, 2018). In the Philippines, this practice has crystallized within the volatile transitions of power among the nation’s competing oligarchic dynasties. The collapse of the “UniTeam” electoral alliance between Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and the Duterte family triggered an institutional war. This conflict showcases how the state apparatus can be systematically weaponized to achieve political neutralization under the guise of statutory compliance (Arugay, 2024).
Scholars increasingly categorize these maneuvers as “autocratic legalism.” This process occurs when populist or elite actors maintain a superficial veneer of legitimacy while hollowed-out democratic institutions are turned against political competitors (Scheppele, 2018). Rather than indicating a robust rule of law, the aggressive deployment of anti-graft bodies, congressional inquiries, and international judicial mechanisms represents a highly coordinated strategy of elite consolidation. The target is clear: the complete political marginalization of the Duterte faction before the 2028 presidential election cycle (Robles, 2025). The constitutional risks of this institutional warfare are severe. By transforming the legal system into a highly polarized battleground, these elite maneuvers threaten to permanently destabilize the democratic architecture of the state, accelerate democratic backsliding, and degrade public trust in the judiciary.
[ EXECUTIVE CO-OPTATION ]
│
┌────────────────┴────────────────┐
▼ ▼
[ ADMINISTRATIVE WEAPONIZATION ] [ TRANSNATIONAL INSTRUMENTALIZATION ]
• Strategic Vetting & Vetoes • Rome Statute Arbitrage
• Selective Anti-Graft Audits • Extradition Treaty Leverage
│ │
└────────────────┬────────────────┘
▼
[ DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING ]
• Structural Erosion of Judicial Neutrality
• Cycles of Dynastic "Vengeance Politics"
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Deconstructing the “Accountability” Veneer: A Methodological Critique
To understand these dynamics, we must analyze the tension between two competing analytical perspectives. On one hand, a formalist legal perspective views the ongoing investigations as legitimate exercises of constitutional oversight and democratic accountability. On the other hand, a realist, critical perspective views these actions as weaponized lawfare.
Proponents of the formalist view argue that the legislative inquiries into Vice President Sara Duterte’s confidential funds and the investigations of former President Rodrigo Duterte’s drug war are driven by a constitutional duty to oversee public spending and protect human rights (Inquirer Opinion, 2026). They point to the House Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability and the Commission on Audit (COA) as independent bodies executing their legal mandates (ABS-CBN News, 2026). This formalist framework, however, suffers from a naive legalism. It ignores the political context and timing of these actions. Labeling these targeted actions as routine administrative oversight overlooks how selective enforcement is used to maintain political dominance.
A more rigorous methodology relies on the concept of autocratic legalism. This framework reveals how formal legal processes are hijacked to serve partisan ends (Scheppele, 2018). In the Philippines, this is not a sudden emergence of reformist zeal. Instead, it is a continuation of “vengeance politics.” Historically, incoming administrations regularly deploy the state’s legal machinery to prosecute and delegitimize their predecessors (Chatham House, 2025). The prosecution of Joseph Estrada by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the subsequent arrest of Arroyo under Benigno Aquino III, and the removal of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno via a highly irregular quo warranto petition under Rodrigo Duterte all point to a structural pattern (GMA News Online, 2019; Gulf News, 2015; Bonoan & Dressel, 2023).
The law, in this context, loses its objective, normative quality. It is reduced to a tool for elite competition. By viewing these actions through a critical lawfare lens, we can see how the state uses legal institutions as a primary weapon to destroy political rivals.
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The Mechanics of Dynastic Decapitation: Administrative, Legislative, and Transnational Weaponization
The campaign to neutralize the Duterte faction relies on a multi-pronged strategy that spans domestic administrative bodies, congressional committees, and transnational legal systems. Each element is designed to isolate the Duterte family and strip them of their political defenses.
Administrative Vetting and Structural Restructuring
A primary method of institutional capture is the strategic manipulation of appointments to key anti-graft and judicial vetting bodies. The dissolution of the Duterte-era Presidential Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC) consolidated anti-graft prosecutorial pathways under a newly aligned Ombudsman (SunStar, 2025). The appointment of close political allies to head these oversight bodies—such as the positioning of former Justice Secretary Jesus Crispin “Boying” Remulla—was widely criticized as a calculated move to facilitate criminal prosecutions against Vice President Sara Duterte and her allies before the 2028 election cycle (SunStar, 2025). This centralization of prosecutorial power represents a clear effort to co-opt independent “referees” to secure partisan advantages (Agabin, 2020).
Legislative Inquiries “In Aid of Legislation”
Legislative inquiries have been transformed into highly effective weapons of political attrition. The House of Representatives, led by close allies of the president, deployed the “Quad-Committee” and the Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability to systematically dismantle the Duterte family’s political shield (Inquirer Opinion, 2026).
While nominally conducted “in aid of legislation” under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, these hearings focused on exposing alleged financial corruption and human rights abuses to damage the public standing of political rivals. This relentless pressure culminated in the impeachment of Vice President Sara Duterte by the House of Representatives on charges of corruption, bribery, and constitutional violations (PCIJ, 2026).
Rather than serving as a mechanism for legislative fact-finding, these inquiries functioned as political theater. They were designed to exhaust the resources of political opponents and render them unviable for future office (Journal of Democracy, 2026).
[ LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY ] ──( Nominally: Fact-Finding )──► [ Public Exposure ]
│
▼ ( Actuality: Subversion of Function )
[ EXTRA-JUDICIAL TRIAL ] ──► [ Political Attrition ] ──► [ Competitor Impeached ]
Transnational Arbitrage and Selective Sovereignty
Perhaps the most striking aspect of this strategy is the administration’s tactical shift regarding the International Criminal Court (ICC). Initially, President Marcos Jr. defended his predecessor, asserting that his administration would “not lift a finger” to assist the ICC’s investigation into Rodrigo Duterte’s anti-drug campaign (Lee, 2025). However, as the “UniTeam” alliance fractured, the administration reversed its position. It facilitated the arrest and transfer of Rodrigo Duterte to The Hague under an Interpol Red Notice in March 2025 (Zvobgo, 2025).
This tactical cooperation with the ICC serves as a powerful political tool. It allows the administration to remove the Duterte patriarch from the domestic political arena while cultivating a reformist, rules-based image internationally (David, 2026). This international cooperation also helps the administration deflect historical critiques of the human rights abuses associated with the elder Ferdinand Marcos’s martial law era (Smith, 2025).
Similarly, the strategic use of the 1995 US-Philippines Extradition Treaty to target Pastor Apollo Quiboloy—a close spiritual adviser and political ally of the Duterte family indicted in the US for sex trafficking—illustrates how international law enforcement cooperation can be leveraged to pressure domestic political rivals (Inquirer, 2024).
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Constitutional Violations and Systemic Backsliding: The Deconstruction of Institutional Trust
The systemic weaponization of the legal system carries profound risks for the constitutional order, threatening the separation of powers and the protection of individual rights.
Usurpation of Judicial Functions and Separation of Powers
The primary constitutional risk of weaponized legislative inquiries is the usurpation of judicial and prosecutorial functions by the legislature. Under the separation of powers doctrine, Congress is not a law-enforcement agency or a court of law. It is constitutionally barred from conducting investigations to “expose for the sake of exposure” or to determine criminal liability (Supreme Court of the United States, 1957; Supreme Court of the Philippines, 2023).
When congressional committees act as de facto courts, they violate the separation of powers and bypass the procedural protections of the judiciary. This concern is central to Philippine jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned that political expediency cannot justify the erosion of constitutional boundaries (Sara Z. Duterte v. House of Representatives, 2025).
Erosion of Due Process and Individual Rights
Inquisitorial legislative inquiries often infringe upon individual constitutional rights, using the threat of contempt, detention, and public shaming to bypass traditional courtroom protections (Philippine Law Journal, 1995). The Supreme Court of the Philippines addressed this issue directly in Duterte v. House of Representatives (2025). The Court ruled that even highly political legislative processes must strictly adhere to the Bill of Rights and due process standards, emphasizing that “the end does not justify the means.”
When the state uses its investigative power to target political opponents, the procedural rights of individuals are often compromised. This undermines the foundational principle that the law must protect all citizens equally.
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COMPARATIVE LAWFARE MATRIX
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FEATURE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT UNITED STATES CONTEXT
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Primary Drivers Fluid, dynastic inter-elite clashes Rigid, two-party ideological
among powerful political families. polarization over policy.
Tactics Employed Quo warranto petitions, targeted Congressional subpoenas, special
impeachments, and ICC cooperation. counsel probes, state indictments.
Refereed Capture Direct executive co-optation of the Partisan battles over judicial
judiciary and anti-graft bodies. appointments and court packing.
Populist Defense Reframing prosecutions as "elite Establishing "anti-weaponisation"
vendettas" to rally the base. funds; claiming deep-state plots.
Violence Threshold Backed by physical violence and Bounded strictly within judicial
extrajudicial state enforcement. and constitutional arenas.
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Degradation of Public Trust and Rule of Law
The long-term consequence of domestic lawfare is the erosion of public trust in democratic institutions. When citizens see the judiciary, anti-graft bodies, and congressional committees used as tools for political warfare, they lose faith in the neutrality of the law (Agabin, 2020). The legal system is no longer viewed as a neutral arbiter of justice. Instead, it is seen as an instrument of political power.
This erosion of trust is reflected in the declining performance of the Philippines on international rule of law indices (Borgen Project, 2023). Furthermore, it fuels a “corruption paradox.” Populist figures can successfully reframe legitimate legal actions as proof of a corrupt, biased “establishment,” mobilizing their base and deepening social polarization (Juan-Torres González, 2025). Rather than strengthening the rule of law, the selective enforcement of the law undermines the legitimacy of democratic governance.
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Analytical Gaps and Horizons for Future Inquiry
While the literature on autocratic legalism and domestic lawfare provides a compelling framework for analyzing these developments, several critical areas require further academic investigation:
* The Impact of Transnational Judicialization on Domestic Sovereignty: Future research should analyze how the increasing involvement of international bodies like the ICC and Interpol affects domestic judicial independence. Does cooperation with these bodies strengthen international accountability, or does it serve as a convenient tool for domestic elites to bypass local constitutional hurdles and delegate political conflicts to international forums?
* The Long-Term Limits of Regional Security Pacts Amid Domestic Instability: The interaction between intense domestic political conflict and international security commitments remains under-analyzed. It is unclear how long-term bilateral agreements like the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) will hold if a marginalized political faction eventually regains executive power. Researchers should examine the vulnerability of these international defense agreements to sudden domestic political shifts.
* The Institutionalization of Counter-Lawfare Mechanisms: The emergence of defensive legal strategies—such as the establishment of partisan legal defense funds—requires closer study. How do these counter-mechanisms affect the functioning of the justice system? Do they help protect individual rights, or do they simply institutionalize partisan polarization within the courts?
Without addressing these deeper structural questions, legal and political scholarship risks focusing only on short-term political developments. It may overlook the systematic hollowing out of democratic institutions that occurs when the rule of law is sacrificed for political advantage.
—
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